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Abstract
We consider the e¤ect of asymmetric information on the price for-
mation process in a quote-driven market where one market maker
receives a private signal on the security fundamental. A model is pre-
sented where market makers repeatedly compete in prices: at each
stage a bid-ask auction occurs and the winner trades the security
against liquidity traders. We show that at equilibrium the market is
not strong-form e¢cient until the last stage. We characterize a rep-
utational equilibrium in which the informed market maker will a¤ect
market beliefs, and possibly misleads them. At this equilibrium, a
price leadership e¤ect arises, quotes are never equal to the expected
value of the asset given the public information, the informed mar-
ket maker expected payo¤ is positive and the rate of price discovery
increases in the last stages of trade before the information becomes
public.
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11 Introduction
Several empirical studies have shown that di¤erent market makers either
have access to di¤erent levels of information, or at least di¤er in their under-
standing of market fundamentals. In the foreign exchange markets, Peiers
(1997) and de Jong et al. (1999) have shown that some commercial banks are
indeed commonly considered to have some informational advantage due to
their preferential relation with the central bank. In the stock markets, Porter
and Weaver (1998) have found some evidence that late trade reporting on
the Nasdaq National Market System is normally associated with informa-
tion contents: they interpreted this phenomenon by suggesting that “market
makers choose to delay the reporting of those trades which either contain
information about short-term price movements or re‡ect deviations from im-
plicit quoting conventions”. Moreover, Cao, Ghysels and Hatheway (1998)
have found evidence of leadership among market makers for a given stock
looking at the pricing patterns in the Nasdaq pre-opening period. Similarly,
Albanesi and Rindi (2000) have detected imitative pricing behavior in the
Italian treasury bill market. These last studies suggest that dealers often
know who among them are the best informed.
From a theoretical point of view, it is thus important to assess the charac-
teristics of the price discovery process in a quote-driven market with trans-
parent price competition among asymmetrically informed market makers.
Indeed, in most of the above mentioned markets, the quotes posted by mar-
ket makers are perfectly observable by all market participants1, whereas in
models à la Kyle or Glosten and Milgrom, private information is held by ‡oor
traders who submit orders that are only partially observable by uninformed
market makers.
This paper will give further inside on both …nancial microstructure theory
and auction theory. From a …nancial market microstructure perspective, we
will show that a highly transparent quote-driven market privately informed
market maker optimally reveals his private signal through the choice of a
noisy pricing strategy. The equilibrium we characterize explains empirically
observed patterns such as price leadership (Peiers 1997), market manipula-
tion (Cao et al. 1998) and excess quote volatility. Some of these phenomena
cannot be explained by the standard microstructure models. As we model
price competition between market makers as a sequential bid-ask auction,
1See Figure 1 for Nasdaq
2Figure 1:
we are able to contribute to this literature with the characterization of an
equilibrium in a common value auction where T identical assets are traded
sequentially. Contrary to what happens in static auctions, until the very last
stages of trade, a market maker’s equilibrium quotes only partially disclose
his private information on the value of the asset. Indeed, bidding strategies
are strictly monotone in market makers signals only in the last of the T
auctions.
We study a model in which a risky asset is exchanged for a riskless asset
between market makers and liquidity traders. In each period, market makers
simultaneously set quotes and automatically execute liquidity traders’ market
orders. This is a close representation of the trading mechanism seen for
example, in Nasdaq’s screen-based order routing and execution systems as
SelectNet and the Small Order Execution System (SOES), where clients’
orders are automatically executed against market makers at the inside quotes.
We quote from a document of NASD Department of Economic Research:
“Nasdaq market makers have also been subject to an increas-
ing level of mostly a¢rmative obligations.
Market makers must continuously post …rm two-sided quotes,
good for 1000 shares [...]; they must report trades promptly; they
3must be subject to automatic execution against their quotes via
SOES; [...]” (J. W. Smith, J. P. Selway III, D. Timothy Mc-
Cormick, 1998-01, page 2).
We assume that one of the market makers is informed about the liquida-
tion value of the risky asset and, at some future date T +1, this information
will be publicly announced. The quantity exchanged in each period is con-
stant and there is no exogenous shock coming from noise traders or from the
arrival of new information. As quotes are observable, the uninformed market
makers extract information on the value of the asset by observing the past
quotes posted by the informed market maker. The latter takes into account
the impact that his current quotes will have on the future uninformed dealers’
quoting strategy.
Our …rst result concerns the informational e¢ciency of the market. We
show that in the last trading period, market maker’s private information is
fully revealed by his quotes but the probability that this revelation occurs
earlier in time is less than one. In other words, the market is strong form
e¢cient in the long run but not in the short run.2
Moreover, we will show that in equilibrium, the informed market maker
endogenously generates some “noise” in his quoting activity, that precludes
the others to infer immediately his private information. In the literature,
another example of noisy pricing comes from Gould and Verecchia (1985).
In a static set up, they proved that when a monopolist specialist has private
information on market fundamental, there exists a rational expectations equi-
librium with noisy price. In order to obtain their result, Gould and Verecchia
require that the specialist can precommit to add an exogenous noise to its
price. By contrast, in our equilibrium this requirement does not exist as the
distribution of noise corresponds to the equilibrium mixed strategy used by
the informed dealer. Our “mixed strategy result” is in line with the literature
that studies the e¤ect of insiders’ disclosure rule in order-driven markets. In
a Kyle ’s framework, Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) proved that the
imposition to the insider of a disclosure rule, induces him to play mixed
strategy in order to avoid the market maker to infer his private information.
Similarly, John and Narayanan (1997) proved that a regulation requiring in-
2Combined with the result of Flood et al. (1998), where they show that e¢ciency
is greatest in the most transparent trading mechanism, we argue that our result should
extend to Nasdaq if dealers are given the option to submit anonymous quotes, and to
anonymous markets as “Telematico” for …xed income securities.
4siders to disclose their trades ex post creates incentives for them to create
“endogenous noise” using mixed strategies and sometimes trading against
their private signal.
The intuition of our result relies on two observations: (i) if the value of
the asset is high it is worth buying it by setting high bid quotes, whereas if
the value of the asset is low it is worth selling it by setting low ask quotes;
and (ii) the more correct is the uninformed dealers’ belief, the smaller will
be the pro…t for the informed market maker. On the one hand, when the
informed market maker chooses the quotes that maximizes his current payo¤,
he reveals part of his information and decreases his future payo¤. On the
other hand, if he chooses quotes that make him lose money in the current
trade, he will increase his future payo¤ by misleading the uninformed market
makers. Thus, we will show that, as long as there are future trading rounds,
it is optimal for the informed market makers to randomize between revealing
his information and misleading the market trading against his signal.
We then provide some empirical implications of this equilibrium.
First, despite there is no exogenous shock during the trading process,
quotes are volatile. Indeed, market makers’ quotes move because the un-
informed dealers’ belief changes and because in every period they are the
outcome of a mixed strategies.
Second, we can measure the speed of information revelation. We …nd that
most of the information revelation in such markets happen in the very last
trading sessions before a public announcement is revealed. This increases the
winners curse during the last trading rounds and explains why in equilibrium
the inside spread is positive and the average market spread increases as the
game reaches its end. This last result explains the empirical observation that
spread increases when the date of the public report approaches. This is in
contrast with both Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) where in
equilibrium the depth of the market is respectively decreasing or constant
across time.
Third, we …nd that the equilibrium presents a positive serial correlation
between the quotes set by the informed dealer at time t and the quotes set
by the uninformed market maker at time t + 1. This is in tune with the
empirical evidence obtained in Peiers (1997) and Cao et al. (1998), Albanesi
and Rindi (2000) where some dealers appear to be price leaders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the formal model. In section 3 we collect the construction of the equilibrium
in the one, two, and T¡steps cases, and we prove the short run information
5ine¢ciency of the equilibrium. In section 4 we derive some empirical predic-
tions from the properties of a numerical solution of the model. In section 5
we conclude, and all proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a market with N risk-neutral market-makers (MMs in the following)
who trade a single security over T periods against liquidity ‡oor traders.
The liquidation value of the security is a random variable e V which can, for
simplicity, take two values, fV ;V g, with V > V ; according to a probability
distribution (p;1 ¡ p) commonly known by all MMs, where p = Pr(e V = V ).
We denote v = pV + (1 ¡ p)V the expected value of the asset for any given
p. The realization of e V occurs at time 0 and at time T + 1 a public report
will announce it to all market participants. Time is discrete and T is …nite.
Information structure
At the beginning of the …rst period of trade, one3 of the MMs, MM1, is
privately informed about the realized liquidation value of the risky asset. We
will refer to the realization (V ;V ) as the “type” of MM1, and call MM1(V )
(resp. MM1(V )) the informed MM when e V = V (resp. e V = V ). The other
N ¡1 market makers do not observe any private signals but they know that
MM1 has received a superior information; we will treat them as a unique
dealer called MM24.
Market Rules
In each period the two MMs simultaneously5 announce their ask and bid
quotes which are …rm for one unit of the asset6. Then, transactions take place
3As in Kyle (1985) we assume that there is only one agent that receive private infor-
mation on the realization of e V .
4This assumption is made without loss of generality because the informed market maker
only considers the probability of winning the auctions at a given price, no matter if this
probability is the outcome of the strategy of one uninformed player or n equally uninformed
players (see also Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al.(1982) and section 3.1).
5For simplicity we do not consider the timing problem arising when the bidding process
is sequential, as in Cordella and Foucault (1998).
6It is standard in the literature to …x the traded quantity in each step (see O’Hara
(1995)), and as we said before this asumption captures quite closely the rules of some
markets.
6between liquidity traders and the market makers. We assume that at each
date, liquidity traders sell one unit of the asset to the market maker who sets
the highest bid, and buy one unit of the asset from the market maker who
sets the lowest ask7 (i.e. price priority is enforced)8. If both market makers
set the same quote, then liquidity traders will exchange with MM2.9 Each
MM can observe the past quotes of all market makers. Finally, we assume
that market makers can not trade with each other and that short sales are
permitted.
Behavior of market participants and equilibrium concept
In each period a buy market order and a sell market order are proposed
by ‡oor traders who trade for liquidity reasons. It is worth stressing that
in our model, traders do not act for informational motives, and so the ‡ow
of market orders neither incorporates nor depends on any information about
the value of the asset. As price priority is enforced in any period, each market
maker knows that he will buy (resp. sell) one asset only if he proposes the
best bid (resp. ask) quote. We denote ai;t and bi;t the ask and bid price
respectively set by market maker i in period t. Assuming that MMs are risk
neutral, we can write the single period payo¤ functions for market makers as
follows:
¦1;t(V ) = (a1;t ¡ V )Pr(a2;t > a1;t) + (V ¡ b1;t)Pr(b2;t < b1;t) (1)
¦1;t(V ) = (a1;t ¡ V )Pr(a2;t > a1;t) + (V ¡ b1;t)Pr(b2;t < b1;t) (2)
for MM1(V ) and MM1(V ) respectively, and for MM2
¦2;t = p(a1;t ¡ V )Pr(a1;t ¸ a2;tje V = V ) + (1 ¡ p)(a1;t ¡ V )Pr(a1;t ¸ a2;tje V = V )+
p(V ¡ b1;t)Pr(b1;t · b2;tje V = V ) + (1 ¡ p)p(V ¡ b1;t)Pr(b1;t · b2;tje V = V )
(3)
The overall payo¤ of each MM is simply the (non discounted) sum for
7As market makers are risk neutral, this is equivalent to assume that in each period
there is a constant probability of observing a buy order or a sell order.
8This is the case, for example, in some Nasdaq’s execution systems (see the introduc-
tion).
9This assumption simpli…es the notation.









For tractability, we restrict to equilibria where the MMs’ strategy are
Markov strategies, which depend only on the state of the game °t = (T ¡1+
t;pt), that is de…ned by the number of trading rounds before the public report
(T ¡1+t), and the uninformed dealer’s belief at beginning of period t, pt
10.
Given this restriction, a mixed strategy for MM2 in period t can be de…ned
with a function ¾2 that maps the state of the game °t into a probability
distribution over all couples of bid-ask quotes. As MM1’s strategy depends
also on his private information, a mixed strategy for MM1 in period t is a
function ¾1 that maps the value of the asset and the state of the game °t
into a probability distribution over all couples of bid-ask quotes. For a given
state of the game ° = (¿;p) we denote ¼¤
1(V;¿;p) and ¼¤
2(¿;p) the expected
equilibrium payo¤ for MM1, given e V = V , and for MM2 respectively.
We characterize the equilibrium strategies ¾¤
1 and ¾¤
2 solving the game by
backward induction: at any time t MMs solve the following problems:
¾
¤
1(V ;¿;pt) = argmax
¾1(V )
¦1;t(V ) + ¼
¤





1(V ;¿;pt) = argmax
¾1(V )
¦1;t(V ) + ¼
¤







¦2;t(V ) + ¼
¤
2(¿ ¡ 1;pt+1) , given ¾
¤
1
where ¿ = T + 1 ¡ t and pt+1 = Pr(e V = V ja1;t;b1;t) is determined by the
Bayes’ rule when this is possible and otherwise, it is arbitrarily chosen.
We denote ¡(T;p) the game representing the strategic interaction among
MMs when there are T …nite rounds of trade and Pr(e V = V ) = p at the
beginning of the game (t = 0).
10MMs could use more complex strategies which depend on the whole set of past quotes,
or at least on a bigger subset of them than in the Markov case. These strategies are
extremely complex to analyze in our framework, and this puts a serious restriction to
their actual implementability.
8It is worth stressing that as market makers can alternatively buy or sell
the security without inventory considerations, no matter the true value of
the asset, there is always one of the two auctions that is pro…table and one
that is not. This suggests that what really matters for the equilibrium of the
game is not the actual value of the asset, V or V , but how close is the belief
of MM2 to the truth: intuitively the more correct are MM2’s belief, the
smaller is MM1’s pro…t. In the appendix we formally state this symmetry
property of the game.
3 Equilibrium characterization
3.1 One trading round
In this section we analyze the dealers’ price competition when T = 1, which
can also be interpreted as the last trading round. The bid auction alone has
been studied by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber (1983) (EMW
henceforth) for an arbitrary distribution of the asset for sale. They showed
that the equilibrium is unique and fully revealing, in the sense that MM2 can
infer unambiguously the value of the asset after observing MM1’s quotes.
Proposition 1 extends their result to the ask auction. Moreover it pro-
vides the equilibrium distribution of bid and ask quotes and market makers’s
equilibrium payo¤ for our speci…cation of the traded asset’s distribution.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the one shot game ¡(1;p) is unique and
it is such that:
(i) MM2 randomizes ask and bid prices according to





0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
x¡v
x¡V for x 2]v;V ]
1 for x 2]V ;1[





0 for x 2] ¡ 1;V [
V ¡v
V ¡x for x 2 [V ;v[
1 for x 2 [v;1[
(ii) If the value of the asset is V , then MM1 sets a1;1 = V and he
9randomizes the bid price according to






0 for x 2] ¡ 1;V ]
(1¡p)(x¡V )
p(V ¡x) for x 2]V ;v]
1 for x 2]v;1[
(iii) If the value of the asset is V , then MM1 sets b1;1 = V and he
randomizes the ask according to





0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
x¡v
(1¡p)(x¡V ) for x 2]v;V ]
1 for x 2]V ;1[
(iv) Equilibrium payo¤s are ¼¤
2(1;p) = 0, ¼¤
1(V ;1;p) = (1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V )
and ¼¤
1(V ;1;p) = p(V ¡ V ).
Just before the public report, the informed market maker has the last
opportunity to gain from his private information and he does not care about
MM2’s posterior beliefs.11 More concretely, if the liquidation value of the
asset is V , MM1 will try to buy the asset by winning the bid auction,
whereas if the liquidation value of the asset is V , he will try to sell the asset
by winning the ask auction. Because the uninformed market maker does not
know whether it is pro…table to buy or to sell the asset, he will try to win
both auctions.
The discrete distribution of e V implies that the equilibrium is in mixed
strategy12. This means that when a MM tries to buy (resp. sell) the asset he
chooses his bid (resp. ask) price quotes using a lottery. In equilibrium bid
quotes are distributed between V and v, whereas ask quotes are distributed
between v and V 13.
11Indeed as MMs set simultaneously their quotes, MM2 will deduce the actual value of
the asset from MM1’s quotes only after having posted his own quotes, that is too late.
12Assuming the support of e V is continous would imply that the one-shot equilibrium
is in pure strategies, but it would not a¤ect the expected equilibrium payo¤ (see EMW
(1982)).
13To understand why a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist notice …rst that, MM2
can always guarantee a zero pro…t by setting a2 = V and b2 = V . For this reason, he never
posts bid greater than v or ask lower than v, as this would provide him with a strictly
negative pro…t. This has two implications: …rst, MM1’s equilibrium payo¤ is strictly
positive as he can always guarantee it: for example, by setting a1 = v ¡ " if e V = V and
10To sum up, in the static game, the asymmetry of information between
market makers leads to three important implications. First, the full rev-
elation of information by MM1 makes the market strong-form e¢cient at
the last stage of trade. This follows from the fact that MM1’s quotes are
observable.
Second, unlike the symmetric information case, given the information
available to market makers, bid and ask market prices are di¤erent from the
expected liquidation value of the asset. Indeed, market spread is typically
positive and bid and ask quotes straddle v. However, there is no restriction
over its width (up to V ¡ V ) which depends on the output of the mixed
strategies.
Third, although the uninformed market maker expected equilibrium pay-
o¤ is zero, the best informed market maker obtains a positive expected payo¤.
More precisely, his informational rent is larger when the MM2’s belief is erro-
neous (i.e. je V ¡vj is large). Indeed, in this case, MM1can win the pro…table
auction at prices that are far from the true value of the asset.
3.2 Informational e¢ciency of the quote-driven mar-
ket
In the last trading period MM1 reveals to the market his private information
through his posted quotes.
At a glance, given that the informed dealer’s quotes are observable, it
would seem that he is going to loose his informational advantage at the …rst
trading round . However, this is not true for any period before the last one.
More precisely, we will demonstrate that, at equilibrium, the probability that
private information is completely conveyed into prices before the last period
auction is less than one.
Consider an equilibrium of ¡(T;p) and let St(e V ) ½ R2 be the support14
of bid and ask prices played in some period t by MM1 given his information
b1 = v+" if e V = V , with " > 0, his pro…t can be arbitrarily close to je V ¡vj > 0; second,
it is never optimal for MM1 to post bid (resp. ask) strictly greater (resp. lower) than v,
when e V = V (resp. e V = V ). Thus if a pure strategy equilibrium exists, then MM1 would
post a¤
1 ¸ v (with probability one) when e V = V and b¤
1 · v when e V = V . But in this case




1, and MM1’s equilibrium payo¤
would be zero, that contradicts the observation that his payo¤ is positive.
14St(e V ) is the smallest subset of R2 such that in equilibrium Pr((a1;t;b1;t) 2 St(e V )) = 1,
for e V 2 fV ;V g.
11e V 2 fV ;V g.
We say that a fully revealing phase occurs in period t, if St(V )\St(V ) = ;.
In this case MM2 unambiguously understands the value of the asset by
observing whether (a1;t;b1;t) belongs to St(V ) or to St(V ).15 After a fully
revealing phase, the true value of the asset is commonly known and the
MMs’ continuation payo¤s are zero. Indeed, when MM2 learns of the true
value of the asset, then the asymmetric information vanishes, the market
makers compete à la Bertrand, bid and ask quotes coincide with the true
value of the asset and all market makers’ payo¤s are zero.
The following theorem shows that no fully revealing phase can occur
before the end of the game.
Theorem 2 In any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, 8t < T the probability that
time t MM1’s quotes fully reveal his private information is less than 1.
Theorem 2 states that private information is never revealed with probabil-
ity one before T and thus, in the short run, it is not possible to infer MM1’s
private information despite his quotes are perfectly observable.16 This in-
formational ine¢ciency result mimics the results obtained in the existing
microstructure models. However, in Kyle’s and Glosten and Milgrom’s style
models, market is not e¢cient because insider traders’ action is confounded
with the exogenous random demand that comes from noise traders. By
contrast, our result does not rely on the existence of this exogenous noise.
Theorem 2 shows that when an informed dealer cannot hide behind noise
traders or anonymity of actions, he will endogenously generate some noise.
The rational of the proof of Theorem 2 is that before the last trading round a
fully revealing phase is not credible. More precisely, if at some t < T, MM1’s
private information was surely fully revealed, then in period t market makers
would play the unique equilibrium of the one shot game. However, in this
case, MM1 has at least one pro…table deviation that consists in mislead-
ing MM2 beliefs in period t and then pro…t from MM2’s completely wrong
beliefs in the following trading periods.
15For example, in the last repetition of the game ST(V ) = f(a1;;b1) : a1 = V , b1 2
]V ;v]g, whereas ST(V ) = f(a1;b1) : a1 2 [v;V [;b1 = V g, and so it results ST(V )\ST(V ) =
;.
16Notice that theorem 2 can be extended to any choice of the distribution of e V .
123.3 Manipulating strategies in equilibrium
Theorem 2 states that market is not e¢cient but it does not specify how in
equilibrium the informed MM manages to hide and exploit his information.
In this section we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium of the dynamic
auction where MM1 generates endogenous noise in his quotes that allows
him to pro…t from his informational advantage for several trading periods.
Before providing the construction of this equilibrium, we shall describe the
main economic forces that produce our results.
From the analysis of the one period case, we already know that in the
last trading stage, MM1 only competes in the pro…table side of the market:
he tries to sell the asset if e V = V or to buy it if e V = V . In the following we
prove that during the trading periods before the last one, MM1 “hides” his
information by participating in the unpro…table side of the market with pos-
itive probability. In this way, MM2 cannot unambiguously deduce MM1’s
information by observing whether MM1 tried to buy or to sell the asset
in the previous period. We de…ne these type of strategies as manipulating
strategies since there is a positive probability that the informed MM takes an
action that aims to turn the uninformed MM’s belief in the wrong direction.
In any period t, MM1’s incentive to mislead MM2 by trying to win the
unpro…table auction depends on two factors: the bene…t that a misleading
action has on the future payo¤, and the current cost of misleading. Intu-
itively, the greater the number of remaining trading periods, the higher the
weight of the future payo¤ will be, and so the greater will be MM1’s bene…t
from misleading MM2 in the current period. The cost of misleading depends
on the correctness of MM2’s belief, as underlined in John and Narayanan
(1997). If we measure the correctness of MM2’s belief with the random
variable e c = 1¡je V ¡vj=(V ¡V ), (that is equal to 1, when MM2 knows the
true value of the asset, and close to 0 when his belief is completely wrong)17,
we …nd that the cost of misleading decreases with e c. To see this point, take
for example the case e V = V . Loosely speaking, if MM1 wants to mislead
MM2, he has to post ask prices close to v, so that he will sell the asset with
positive probability18. However, if e c is close to 0, then v will be close to V
and so, if MM1 misleads, he risks selling the asset at price that is much lower
than its actual value, V . Thus, the cost of misleading the market decreases
17Notice that if e V = V the e c = p, whereas e c = 1 ¡ p when e V = V .
18Intuitively, MM2 will never accept to sell the asset at a price a2 < v so that MM1 can
be sure to win the ask auction with an a1 su¢ciently close to v.
13with the correctness of MM2’s belief.
Let ¿ be the number of trading stage before the public report. In the
equilibrium we characterize, if e c > 21¡¿, then MM1 misleads the market
with some probability, and tries to win the pro…table auction with the com-
plementary probability. The fact that the threshold 21¡¿ decreases with ¿,
means that a misleading action is more likely to occur in the early stages of
trade as it can be turned to account during several periods. Moreover, as
21¡¿ converges exponentially to 0 when ¿ increases, implies that misleading
occurs with positive probability for any given level of belief, provided that
there are enough trading rounds before the public report. For this reason
one should expect informativeness of MM1’s quotes to be low at time zero
and to increase when T approaches.
The following proposition summarizes this qualitative description of the
equilibrium:
Proposition 3: Consider the game ¡(T;p). Whenever a market maker
tries to win the bid or the ask auction he randomizes his current bid on the
support [bmin;v] or his current ask on the support [v;amax] respectively, where
bmin and amax depend on the state of the game °t = (T ¡ t;pt).
In the t-th trading round, MM2 tries to win both auctions, bid and ask.
If e c < 21¡(T¡t), then MM1 tries to win only the pro…table auction. If e c >
21¡(T¡t), then MM1 randomizes between trying to win only the pro…table
auction and trying to win only the unpro…table auction.
A MM’s equilibrium expected payo¤ is zero if he is uninformed and it is
positive if he is informed.
The following section contains the constructive proof of proposition 3 for
the case of two trading periods. The proof of the general case is in the
appendix.
3.3.1 The two-periods game
This section contains the constructive proof of proposition 3 in the case
T = 2. Notice that we are looking for an equilibrium of a particular kind,
leaving the question of the existence of other equilibria unresolved.
To begin with, consider the game ¡(2;p) with p > 1=2. According to
proposition 3, the equilibrium satis…es the following two characteristics:
Feature A) Take the …rst trading round, t = 1. In equilibrium, MM2
14tries both to buy and to sell the asset simultaneously by randomizing his bid
and ask quotes on the support [bmin;v] £ [v;amax].
If the value of the asset is V , then e c = 1 ¡ p < 1=2 and the informed
market maker competes only in the pro…table auction. That is, he posts a bid
price equal to bmin and he randomizes the ask price in the interval [v;amax[.
If e V = V , then e c = p > 1=2 and MM1 randomizes between trying to
buy the asset, and misleading MM2 by trying to sell the asset. If he tries
to buy the asset he randomizes the bid price in ]bmin;v] and posts the ask
equal to a1;1 = amax; whereas he misleads, by posting a bid equal to bmin and
randomizing his ask in [v;amax[.
Feature B) In each period MM2’s expected payo¤ is zero in each of the
bid and ask auctions.
Thus, in order to prove proposition 3 in the case T = 2 and p > 1=2,
it is su¢cient to prove that there is an equilibrium that satis…es features
(A) and (B). We proceed as follows: …rst, we derive some properties that
MMs’ quoting strategies must satisfy in an equilibrium with features (A) and
(B). Second, we provide su¢cient conditions on MMs’ strategies so that the
resulting strategies form an equilibrium that actually satis…es these features.
For convenience we use the following notation to describe the …rst period
equilibrium distribution of market makers’ quotes, and MM2’s posterior
beliefs
Notation: G(b) = Pr(b1;1 · bje V = V ), G(b) = Pr(b1;1 · bje V = V ),
F(a) = Pr(a1;1 < aje V = V ), F(a) = Pr(a1;1 < aje V = V ). Furthermore,
g(b) = G
0
(b) and f(a) = F
0
(a) and Post(a;b) = Pr(e V = V ja1;1 = a;b1;1 = b).
Lemma 4: If p > 1=2 and the equilibrium of the game ¡(2;p) satis…es
features (A) and (B), then for any ask a 2 [v;amax] and bid b 2 [bmin;v], it
results
G(b) =
(1 ¡ p)(b ¡ V )
p(V ¡ b)
G(b) (4)
1 ¡ F(a) =
p(V ¡ a)
(1 ¡ p)(a ¡ V )
(1 ¡ F(a)) (5)
15Furthermore, for any ask a 2 [v;amax[ or any bid b 2 ]bmin;v], it results
Post(amax;b) =
g(b)(b ¡ V )2
(V ¡ V )(g(b)(b ¡ V ) ¡ G(b))
(6)
Post(a;bmin) =
f(a)(a ¡ V )2
(V ¡ V )(f(a)(a ¡ V ) + 1 ¡ F(a))
(7)
Expressions (4) and(5) provide the relationbetweenMM1(V ) andMM1(V )
quotes distribution that guarantees that MM2’s payo¤ is zero for any ask
and bid quotes in [v;amax] and [bmin;v] respectively. Indeed, if in equilibrium
MM2 randomizes his quotes on this support (feature A), then his expected
payo¤ must be constant and equal to his equilibrium payo¤ (that is zero for
feature (B)) for any choice of (a2;b2) in [v;amax] £ [bmin;v].
From feature (A) we know that MM1 never tries to simultaneously buy
and sell the asset. Expressions (6) and (7) provide MM2’s posterior beliefs
after observing that MM1 tried to buy the asset at price b or to sell it at
price a respectively. These expression are obtained applying the Bayes’ rule
and using relations (4) and (5). Moreover, feature (A) implies that if in
the …rst period MM1 posts a bid quote that has a positive probability to
win the bid auction, then he reveals that e V = V . Indeed, when p > 1=2,
MM1 tries to win the bid auction only if e V = V . By contrast, if in the …rst
period MM1 posts an ask quote that has a positive probability to win the
ask auction, then MM2 cannot perfectly infer the value of the asset from
MM1’s quotes19.
Now we derive the …rst period bid prices equilibrium distributions. Ac-
cording to feature (A), when e V = V , in equilibrium MM1 never competes
in the bid auction, that means G(b) = 1 for any b ¸ bmin. Substituting this
expression in (4), it results
G(b) =
(1 ¡ p)(b ¡ V )
p(V ¡ b)
(8)
Expression (8) and G(b) = 1 represent the distribution of MM1’s bid
quotes for any bid b 2 [bmin;v] when e V = V and e V = V respectively.
19Indeed, according to feature (A) MM1 tries to win the ask auction with positive
probability no matter his private information.
16Now we derive MM2’s bid price distribution in equilibrium. MM1’s
global equilibrium payo¤ when e V = V is equal to his expected payo¤ from





= (V ¡ b)Pr(b2;1 < b) + (a ¡ V )Pr(a2;1 > a) + (1 ¡ Post(a;b))(V ¡ V )
(9)
where the third term is the gain in the second period.20 According to fea-
ture (A), any couple (a;b) such that a = amax and b 2]bmin;v] belongs to
MM1(V )’s equilibrium support. Moreover, if in the …rst period MM1 tries
to buy the asset and not to sell it, then he will fully reveal that e V = V , and
his second period payo¤ will be zero.21 Finally, according to feature (A),
MM2 never posts ask price greater than amax and so Pr(a2;1 > amax) = 0.
Thus, evaluating expression (9) for a = amax and b 2]bmin;v] we have
¼
¤
1(V ;2;p) = (V ¡ b)Pr(b2;1 < b) (10)
Evaluating expression(9) for(a;b) = (amax;v), andconsidering that Pr(b2;1 <
v) = 1, we have that
¼
¤
1(V ;2;p) = (1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V ) (11)
Substituting (11) in (10) and solving for Pr(b2;1 < b), it results
Pr(b2;1 < b) = G2(b) =
(1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V )
(V ¡ b)
(12)
20Remember that the equilibrium payo¤s of the last stage game are:
¼¤
1(V ;1;pT) = (1 ¡ pT)(V ¡ V )
¼¤
1(V ;1;pT) = pT(V ¡ V )
and,considering two stages, pT = Post(a;b):
21Notice that substituting expression (8) and its derivative in (6) it results
Post(amax;b) = 1: when MM2 observes that MM1 tries to buy the asset in the …rst
round, he infers that e V = V .
17Expression (12) represents the distribution of MM2’s bid quotes for any
bid b 2]bmin;v]. Distribution G2(b) is such that when e V = V , MM1’s payo¤
from posting a1;1 = amax and any b1;1 2]bmin;v] is equal to (1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V ).
Now we compute the ask quotes distribution. According to feature (A),
if in the …rst period MM1 sets an ask a that has a positive probability
of winning the ask auction (i.e. a1;1 2 [v;amax[), then he stays out of the
bid auction setting a bid b1;1 = bmin. That means any couple (a;b) with
a1;1 2 [v;amax[ and b = bmin belongs to the equilibrium support of all MMs
no matter their information. Considering that Pr(b2;1 < bmin) = 0, then for
any a 2 [v;amax[ and b = bmin, it results
¼
¤
1(V ;2;p) = (a ¡ V )Pr(a2;1 > a) + (1 ¡ Post(a;bmin))(V ¡ V ) (13)
¼
¤




1(V ;2;p) + ¼
¤
1(V ;2;p) = (2a ¡ V ¡ V )Pr(a2;1 > a) + (V ¡ V ) (15)




1(V ;2;p) + ¼
¤
1(V ;2;p) = 2p(V ¡ V ) (16)
Substituting expression (16) in expression (15) and solving for Pr(a2;1 > a),
it results
Pr(a2;1 > a) = 1 ¡ F2(a) =
(p ¡ 1=2)(V ¡ V )
a ¡ 1
2(V + V )
(17)
Expression (17) represents the distribution of MM2’s ask quotes for any
ask a 2 [v;amax] for an equilibrium that satis…es features (A) and (B).
Expressions (11) and (16) lead to
¼
¤
1(V ;2;p) = (3p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V ) (18)
Now we characterize the distribution of the informed market makers ask
quotes.
Substituting expressions (7), in (13) and solving for f(:), we obtain a …rst
order di¤erential equation in F(a):
f(a) =
(a ¡ V + (V ¡ a)F2(a) ¡ ¼¤
1(V ;2;p))(1 ¡ F(a))
(a ¡ V )(¼¤
1(V ;2;p) ¡ (V ¡ a)F2(a))
(19)
18Where ¼¤
1(:) and F2(:) are those in expressions (11) and (17) respectively.
Solving di¤erential equation (19) and using the initial condition Pr(a1;1 ·
vje V = V ) = F(v) = 0, we obtain the distribution function of the informed
MM ask price when e V = V .22 We use then (5) to …nd F(a), the distribution
of MM1’s ask prices when e V = V . This method provides the distribution
function of MM’s bid and ask quotes for any bid or ask that belong to MM’s
equilibrium support as described in feature (A).
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium for game ¡(2;p) when
p > 1=2, what remains is to …nd the values of amax and bmin and to show
that there are no pro…table deviations. These last conditions are shown in
the proof of the following Proposition (see the Appendix).
Proposition 5: Consider the game ¡(2;p) when p > 1=2 and let F2(a),
G2(b), G(b), F(a), Post(a;bmin:) and Post(amax;b) be de…ned by expressions
(17), (12), (8), (5), (7) and (6) respectively; let F(a) be the solution of the
di¤erential equation (19) together with the initial condition F(v) = 0; let
amax = V and bmin be the solution of G(bmin) = F(V ).
Then the following strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium:
In the …rst trading round
(i) MM2 randomizes his ask and bid prices according to




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
F2(x) for x 2 [v;amax[
1 for x 2 [amax;1]




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;bmin]
G2(x) for x 2]bmin;v]
1 for x 2]v;1]
(ii) If the value of the asset is V then, with probability (1 ¡ F(amax)),
MM1 sets a1;1 = amax and randomizes his bid quotes on the support [v;bmin[;
whereas with probability F(amax), he sets b1;1 = bmin and randomizes his ask
22The boundary condition follows from feature (A). The resulting di¤erential equation
is of the form f(x) =
®+¯x
°+±x+²x2+³x3(1¡F(x)) where ®, ¯, °, ±, ², ³ are real numbers, and
it has a closed form solution.
19on the support [v;amax] ; furthermore it results




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
F(x) for x 2 [v;amax]
1 for x 2]amax;1]




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;bmin]
G(x) for x 2]bmin;v]
1 for x 2]v;1]
(iii) If the value of the asset is V , then MM1 sets b1;1 = bmin and ran-
domizes his ask on the support [v;amax] ; furthermore it results




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
F(x) for x 2 [v;amax[
1 for x 2]V ;1]
(iv) MM2’s posterior belief is p2 = Pr(V = V ja1;1;b1;1) with
p2 =
½
1 if b1;1 > bmin and a1;1 = V
Post(a1;1;bmin) if a1;1 < [v;amax[ and b1;1 = bmin
(v) in the second trading round market makers’ strategies correspond to
the equilibrium of the game ¡(1;p2).
(vi) Equilibrium payo¤ are ¼¤
2(2;p) = 0, ¼¤
1(V ;2;p) = (1¡p)(V ¡V ) and
¼¤
1(V ;2;p) = (3p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V ).
By using the symmetry property of the game it is possible to characterize
the equilibrium strategy in the …rst round of trade when p < 1=2. In this case,
at t = 0, MM1(V ) always tries to buy the asset, while MM1(V ) randomizes
between trying to buy and to sell it. The equilibrium payo¤ are equal to 0
for MM2, (2 ¡ 3p)(V ¡ V ) for MM1(V ) and p(V ¡ V ) for MM1(V ).
Finally, if p = 1=2, then at t = 0, all market makers set bid and ask
quotes equal to v = (V + V )=2 and posterior belief does not change.23
23Such pure strategy equilibrium exists only for p = 1=2 and it is sustained by the
following out of equilibrium path belief:
Pr(V = V ja1;1;b1;1) =
½
1 for b1;1 > 1=2
0 for a1;1 < 1=2
20We conclude this section with two observations. First, we point out an
important characteristic that is peculiar to our model: the possibility to
quantify the price-leadership e¤ect of informed market makers in quote driven
markets.
Lemma 6: In the equilibrium of the game ¡(2;p) for p > 1=2 an increase
in the …rst period MM1’s ask quote increases MM2’s expected quote in
the second period, whereas MM2’s …rst period quotes do not a¤ect MM1’s




(2p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V )2
(2a1;1 ¡ V ¡ V )2 > 0
@E[b2;2]
@a1;1
= ¡ln(1 ¡ Post(a;binf))
(2p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V )2













Lemma 6 proves that a high ask price for MM1 in the …rst trading round
increases the expected quotes for MM2 in the second round.
Simulations suggest that the covariance between two successive ask quotes
of MM1 and MM2 is roughly 15% of (V ¡V ) that represents a signi…cative
price e¤ect of MM1 over MM2. The e¤ect that MM1’s …rst period bid price
has on MM2 second period price is even sharper. Indeed, any b1;1 > bmin
moves posterior belief to 1, and so in the second stage quotes jump to V .
The second observation is that MM1 ex-interim total equilibrium payo¤s
for the game ¡(2;p) are continuous piecewise-linear monotone function in p.





(2 ¡ 3p)(V ¡ V ) if p · 1=2




p(V ¡ V ) if p · 1=2
(3p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V ) if p > 1=2
This suggests that we can apply recursively the same method used in this
section to obtain the equilibrium when the market makers interactions last
an arbitrary number of periods T (see the Appendix).
214 Equilibrium properties and empirical im-
plications
In this section, we will compute numerical solutions of the equilibrium de-
scribed in Lemma 9 in the appendix, using V = 1 and V = 0 and varying
the initial belief p and the length of the game T.
The purpose is to assess the properties in terms of informational e¢ciency
and liquidity of our equilibrium.
4.1 Informational e¢ciency
One of the appealing properties of auction mechanisms is that it is possible
to extract the bidders’ private information on the value of the auctioned
object by observing the bidders’ bid. Not surprisingly, this is con…rmed by
the analysis of our one shot auction. Indeed, in the last period, quotes fully
reveal MM1 information. However, Theorem 2 shows that this is not the
case when identical assets are traded sequentially with an auction mechanism.
Indeed, the probability that MM1’s quotes fully reveal his information before
T is less than one. The equilibrium we have characterized in proposition 3
allows as to characterize the minimum necessary number of trading rounds
to observe fully revealing quotes with positive probability.
Lemma 7: If T is the number of periods before the public report, then the
probability of observing fully revealing quotes in the current stage is positive
if, and only if, e c > 1 ¡ 21¡T.
MM1’s quotes do not reveal completely his information as long as MM2’s
belief is su¢ciently incorrect. Thus, the minimum amount of time required
to have a strong form e¢cient market corresponds to the minimum amount
of time required to have MM2’s belief su¢ciently correct. In Figures 2 and
3 we consider a game where the public report occurs after 20 rounds of trade.
These …gures represent the maximum and the minium levels that equilibrium
posterior belief can reach after t rounds of trade for p = 0:07 and p = 0:4
respectively.
Figure 4 plots the same variables for p = 0:4 when there are only 10
rounds of trade before the public report.
Consider …rst Figure 2. When p = 0:07 and e V = V , then e c is high.
Still, a fully revealing price will be observed between the 4-th and the 20-th






























round, but not before. If e c is low (i.e. e V = V ), then one has to wait at least
to the 13-th rounds for a fully revealing price. This suggests that private
information is incorporated into quotes faster when uninformed MM beliefs
are correct. Comparing Figures 3 and 4, we can also see that MM1 has more
incentives to quickly reveal his signal when the date of the public report is
closer. Indeed, the threshold 1¡21¡T that e c must reach for having a positive
probability to observe fully revealing quotes, decreases when the end of the
game approaches.
Alternatively, we can measure the informational e¢ciency of the market
with the evolution of the variance of the true value conditioned on all relevant
public information, §t. The closer we are to the end of the game the lower is
§t; that drops to zero when the quotes of MM1 signal his actual information.
The faster the convergence of §t to zero, the better the properties of the
market.
Figure 5 plots the expected rate of change of §t after each trading round
for a game repeated 5 times and two di¤erent levels of the initial prior. The
variance of the value of the risky asset decreases at a rate that depends
on the level of the initial prior belief. When this prior belief is close to
1 or 0 (thick line), the initial variance of e V decreases more slowly than









when the prior is close to 1=2 (dotted line). In both cases, however, §t
reduces at an increasing rate, which means that less information is revealed
at the early stages and MM1’s quotes reveal more during the last rounds of
trade. It is interesting to compare this with the known results on the rate of
price discovery in models of order-driven markets (Kyle (1985), Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), Huddart, Hughes
and Levine (2001)). In all these models §t is either constant or decreases at
a dwindling rate, implying that most of the private information is conveyed
into the prices relatively early on in the game. Our result suggests that in a
repeated auction framework where dealers compete in prices the …rst stages
of the game are “waiting” stages with a relatively low signalling activity,
while most of the information is released in the very last trading stages.
4.2 The expected cost of trading
Some empirical and experimental evidence have shown that the inside spreads
usually widen as the moment some public announcement is supposed to be
released approaches. Indeed, in …gure 6 we show that for a …xed level of p,
the expected inside spread in the …rst round of trade increases as the date of







Expected market ask and bid
Figure 6:
public report approaches. In the last stages game, the spread is maximum.
This …nding is in tune with the description of equilibrium. In the early
phases of trading rounds, the MM1’s incentive to mislead is strong. This im-
plies that the sign of MM1’s information a¤ects slightly his quoting strategy
during the initial trading rounds. However, as T approaches the incentive to
mislead decreases and private information strongly a¤ects MM1 strategies.
In other words, at the beginning of the game, the winner’s curse is weak as
being the buyer or the seller of the asset does not tell much about what the
true value of the asset is. Thus, initially bid ask quotes are on the average
concentrated around the ex-ante expected value of the asset. However, when
a value-relevant information is drawing near, MM1’s strategy will depend
sharply on his private information and competition between specialists will
be heavily a¤ected by the winner’s curse. This forces the uninformed to quote
quite “conservatively”, and thus on the average the spread will increase. To
sum up, at the end of the game more private information is released, and the
winners’ course e¤ect is indeed stronger.
264.3 Price leadership
The manipulating equilibrium of proposition 3 can explain the price lead-
ership phenomena that has been documented in the empirical literature on
foreign exchange, OTC markets and Nasdaq. Indeed, at equilibrium there
is a positive correlation between the quotes posted by the uninformed MM
and the quotes that the informed MM posted in the previous trading stage.
The explanation is simple: the informed MM is more likely to post relatively
high quotes when he knows e V = V rather than when e V = V . Thus, the
higher are the informed MM quotes, the more the uninformed MM will be
induced to believe that e V = V and to increase on average his own quotes in
the following trading stage. Indeed, in equilibrium, MM2 ’s posterior belief
is an increasing function of MM1’s last quotes, and MM2 ’s expected quotes













One should expect that this leadership e¤ect increases as the date of the
public report approaches as MM1’s quotes become more informative.
4.4 The value of information
Finding the value of private information has been a central issue in …nancial
economics. In most of the microstructure literature the existence of equilibria
where the information has a positive value seems to be related to the presence
of exogenous noise in the economy. For example, in Kyle (1985) the pro…t of
the insider trader is proportional to the volatility of noise traders’ demand.
We show that this is not the case in a quote driven market, as a market
maker can derive a positive pro…t from superior information even without
exogenous noise in the market. This result is known in the auction literature
(EMW (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982)) for auctions where a single object
is sold and one bidder is privately informed on the value of the object. We
contribute to this literature showing that in our bid-ask, repeated auction
there are two factors that a¤ect the value of the private information: the
ex-ante volatility of e V and the length of the game T.







MM1's ex- ante expected payoff
Figure 7:
The volatility of the fundamental is measured by the unconditional vari-
ance of e V = p(1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V )2. Figure 7 plots MM1’s ex-ante equilibrium
payo¤ as a function of p for the game repeated once (thin curve), 15 times,
and 30 times (thick curve). The ex-ante payo¤ is maximum when the un-
certainty in the market is high, that corresponds to p close to 1=2. Not
surprisingly, private information is more valuable in markets where little is
known about large shocks on the fundamentals.
Figure 7 shows that the informed MM’s payo¤ increases with the number
of trading rounds available before the public report occurs. However, the
increment in MM1’s payo¤ from one additional trading round decreases
with T. Figure 8 plots MM1’s ex-ante expected marginal pro…t from adding
two more trading rounds when p is around 0.5.
5 Conclusion
When there is asymmetric information between market makers in a quote
driven market, quotes fully incorporate private information in the long run
but not in the short run. Despite the highest possible transparency of the








Percentage increase of MM1's ex- ante payoff
Figure 8:
market, that allows all dealers and ‡oor traders to observe the best informed
agent’s actions (i.e. his bid and ask quotes), the market is not strong-form
e¢cient. Indeed, at equilibrium the informed market maker strategically
releases his private information with mixed strategies with the purpose to
create some endogenous noise. This equilibrium behavior has at least four
important empirical implications: …rst, trading prices are di¤erent from the
expected value of the risky asset given market makers’ information in any
period; second, despite the lack of noise trading and new shocks in the funda-
mentals, quotes are volatile ; third, there is a positive correlation between the
informed market makers quotes at t and the uninformed market maker quotes
at t+1 and …nally, the private information has a positive value even in such
a highly transparent markets, this justi…es the activity of costly collection of
information by institutional dealers.
296 Appendix
Symmetry: The game ¡(T;p) is symmetric with respect to the following
transformation:
e V
0 = V + V ¡ e V (20)
a
0
i;t = V + V ¡ bi;t (21)
b
0
i;t = V + V ¡ ai;t (22)
p
0 = 1 ¡ p (23)
Proof: It is su¢cient to write MMs’ payo¤s substituting to ai;t the ex-
pression V +V ¡b0
i;t and to bi;t the expression V +V ¡a0
i;t; i = 1;2. Once MMs
types are changed following (20), we obtain payo¤s that di¤er from the origi-
nal ones just for the use of the new variables (a0
i;t, b0
i;t, p0) and types e V 0. Thus,
one can derive the equilibrium of the game ¡(T;p¡1) using the equilibrium
strategies of the game ¡(T;p). For example if at equilibrium of the game
¡(T;p) it results that Pr(b1;t · xje V = V ) = G(x;V ), then there is an equi-
librium of the game ¡(T;p¡1) where Pr(a1;t > xje V = V +V ¡V ) = G(x;V ),
and similarly for the strategies of the other players.
Proof of proposition 1: The one shot game is a …rst price bid-ask
auction with proprietary of information. The bid auction has been studied
in EMW, considering that the ask auction is homomorphic to a bid auction,
this proposition follows from their result. For expositional completeness, we
show that the described strategy pro…le is an equilibrium while we leave
uniqueness as a consequence of EMW result.
Substituting the expression F
¤(x) and G
¤
(x) in expression (3), it results
that MM2’s payo¤ is 0 for any b2 · v and any a2 ¸ v. If MM2 sets b2 > v,
then he is sure to win the bid auction with an expected pro…t of v ¡ b2 < 0.
Similarly¨, any a2 < v would lead to a loss in the ask auction. Therefore,
there does not exist any pro…table deviation for MM2. Substituting the
G¤(x) in (1), it follows that MM1(V )’s payo¤ is equal to (1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V )
for any b1 2]V ;v]; if b1 · V , then MM1(V ) does not win the bid auction
and his payo¤ is 0; if b1 > v, then MM1(V ) wins the bid auction and his
payo¤ is V ¡b1 < V ¡v = (1¡p)(V ¡V ). This means that MM1(V ) does
not have a pro…table deviation on the bid auction. On the ask auction any
a1 < V (resp. a1 > V ) would lead to negative pro…t (resp. 0 pro…t), so that
a1 = V is a best reply. A symmetric argument applies for MM1(V ). ¥
30Proof of Theorem 2. The proof contains one lemma.
Lemma 8: If in equilibrium the private information is revealed with prob-
ability one at t · T, then time t equilibrium strategies are those of the one
shot game equilibrium described in proposition 1.
Proof: Let (¾1(V ), ¾1(V ), ¾2) be some fully revealing equilibrium strat-
egy pro…le that is played in t. After time t there is no asymmetry of informa-
tion and each player will set bid and ask prices equal to the true value of the
asset. Using standard backward induction argument, it results that players’
equilibrium payo¤ after t is equal to zero. Thus players total equilibrium
payo¤ from time t to T is equal to the stage t payo¤.
To prove the lemma, suppose that (¾1(V ), ¾1(V ), ¾2) is di¤erent from the
unique equilibrium of the one shot game. Therefore, there is some player i
(i = MM1(V ) or MM1(V ) or MM2) that could deviate in time t increasing
his stage t payo¤; furthermore he could set ai;¿ = V and bi;¿ = V for any
¿ > t providing a continuation payo¤ not smaller than 0. This is a prof-
itable deviation as it increases his time t payo¤ and does not decrease his
continuation payo¤; thus a contradiction.¤
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium where in some period t < T
the probability of full revelation is one. Then, after time t, there will be no
asymmetry of information, each MM will set bid and ask prices equal to the
true value of the asset and MMs will make no pro…ts.
From lemma 8, at time t all agents behave as if they were in the last
repetition of the game whose unique equilibrium is described in Proposition 1.
From proposition 1, MM1(V )’s equilibrium payo¤ is equal to (1¡pt)(V ¡V ).
Now consider the following deviation for MM1(V ) :
b1;t = V
a1;t = V ¡ "
with " > 0. MM1(V )’s stage t deviation payo¤ is equal to ¡"Pr(a2 >
V ¡ "); this can be set arbitrarily close to 0 by choosing " small. In the
one shot equilibrium the quotes b1;t = V and a1;t = V ¡ " are played with
positive probability only when the state of nature is V ; therefore, when MM2
observes b1;t = V and a1;t = V ¡ ", he believes that the value of the asset
is V and his posterior belief in t + 1 will be pt+1 = 0. Thus, in t + 1 the
31uniformed market maker will set a2;t+1 = b2;t+1 = V . Consequently, in t + 1,
MM1(V ) can reach a payo¤ arbitrarily close to (V ¡V ) by playing a1;t+1 = V
and b1;t+1 = V + ". It follows that MM1(V )’s overall deviation payo¤ can
be arbitrarily close to (V ¡ V ) that is greater than his equilibrium payo¤
(1 ¡ pt)(V ¡ V ), thus a contradiction. ¥
Proof of lemma 4: We provide the proof for equations (5) and (7),
a similar argument applies to the bid side. From feature(B), the MM2
equilibrium payo¤ in the …rst period for the ask auction is zero, thus for any
ask a belonging to MM2’s equilibrium support, his current payo¤ on the ask
auction is
p(a ¡ V )(1 ¡ F(a)) + (1 ¡ p)(a ¡ V )(1 ¡ F(a)) = 0
Solving for (1 ¡ F(a)), it results
(1 ¡ F(a)) =
p(a ¡ V )
(1 ¡ p)(a ¡ V )
(1 ¡ F(a))




(a ¡ V )(V ¡ a)f(a) ¡ (1 ¡ F(x)(V ¡ V )
¤
(1 ¡ p)(a ¡ V )2 (24)
where f(a) = F
0(a). If MM1 randomizes ask prices according to the lotteries
with densities f(:), f(:), then it results by Bayes’ rule that
Pr(V = V ja1;1 = a;b1;1 = bmin) =
pf(a)
pf(a) + (1 ¡ p)f(a)
substituting (24) in this expression and simplifying, equation (7) follows. ¥
Proof of proposition 5: From the construction of the equilibrium, we
know that if market makers follow the strategies described in the proposition,
then their payo¤ are those provided in (iv). Still, we need to prove that there
are no pro…table deviations in the …rst trading stage. First, consider MM2.
If he sets b2;1 · v, then his current payo¤ is zero. If he sets b2;1 > v, then
he is sure to win the bid auction and his current expected payo¤ is equal to
v¡b2;1 < 0. Thus, the uninformed MM has no pro…table deviation in the bid
32auction. A similar argument applied to the ask auction proves that MM2
has no pro…table deviations. Consider now MM1(V ), a possible deviation
is to set b1;1 = bmin +", a1;1 = V , b1;2 = V and a1;2 = V ¡". After observing
MM1’s quotes in the …rst stage, MM2 will believe that e V = V and he will
set a2;2 = b2;2 = V . Thus, MM1(V )’s expected payo¤ from this deviation
can be made arbitrarily close to
(V ¡ bmin)G2(bmin) + (V ¡ V )
where the …rst term is the loss in the …rst period and the second term is the
gain in the second period. Considering (8) it results that this expression is
not greater than ¼¤
1(V ;2;p) = (3p¡1)(V ¡V ) if bmin ¸ (V +V )=2. Another
possible deviation for both MM1(V ) and MM1(V ) is to propose bid and
ask prices that have a positive probability to win both bid and ask auctions
(i.e. b1;1 > bmin and a1;1 < V ). This is not pro…table if there exist an out of
equilibrium belief post(a1;b1) such that
(1 ¡ p)(V ¡ V ) ¸ (a1 ¡ V )(1 ¡ F2(a1)) + (V ¡ b1)G2(b1) + (1 ¡ post(a1;b1))(V ¡ V )
(3p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V ) ¸ (a1 ¡ V )(1 ¡ F2(a1)) + (V ¡ b1)G2(b1) + post(a1;b1)(V ¡ V )
Where F2(:) and G2(:) are given by (17) and (12). Easy computation shows
that such a belief exists whenever bmin ¸ (V + V )=2. We can conclude that
if bmin ¸ (V +V )=2, then MM1 has no pro…table deviations as cross quotes
and huge spread are clearly dominated.
Finally, if MM1(V ) never tries to simultaneously buy and sell the asset,
then the probability of bidding on the ask side must be equal to the prob-
ability of not bidding on the bid side this is true when Pr(b1;1 = bminjV ) =
G(bmin) = F(V ) = Pr(a1;1 < V ). Solving numerically this equation we …nd
bmin > (V + V )=2, and this complete the proof. ¥
Proof of lemma 6: Let p2 = Pr(V = V ja1;1;b1;1 = binf) and let v2 =





¤(x) + V (1 ¡ F





¤(x) + V G
¤(V ) = v2 ¡ (1 ¡ p2)ln(1 ¡ p2)(V ¡ V )
33where F¤(:) and G¤(:) are given in Proposition 1. Deriving this expression
with respect to p2 we have
@E[a2;2]
@p2
= ¡(V ¡ V )ln(p2) > 0
@E[b2;2]
@p2
= ¡(V ¡ V )ln(1 ¡ p2) > 0
Rearranging expression (14) , we have
p2 = Post(a1;1;bmin) =
¼¤
1(V ;2;p) ¡ (a1;1 ¡ V )(1 ¡ F2(a1;1))
(V ¡ V )





(2p ¡ 1)(V ¡ V )
(2a1;1 ¡ V ¡ V )2













@a1;1. To prove that MM1 quotes in the second period
do not depend on MM2’s quotes in the …rst period it is su¢cient to observe
that the distribution of (a1;2;b1;2) is only a¤ected by p2 that does not change
with MM2’s quotes. ¥
Proof of lemma 7: First note that e c > 1¡21¡T when p > 1¡21¡T and
e V = V , or when p < 2T¡1, and e V = V . Take T > 1 and suppose p > 1¡21¡T.
If e V = V , then e c = p > 1 ¡ 21¡T > 21¡T and for Proposition 3 the informed
market maker will randomize between trying to buy and trying to sell the
asset. However, if e V = V then e c = 1 ¡ p < 21¡T and MM1 will only try to
sell. As a result, if p > 1 ¡ 21¡T , then MM1 tries to buy the asset if and
only if e V = V , and so if MM2 observes b1;1 > bmin he infers that e V = V .24
Similarly when T > 1 and e c < 1¡21¡T (i.e. when 21¡T < p < 1¡21¡T), the
probability that MM1’s current quotes fully reveal his information is zero.
Indeed, in this case, e c > 21¡T no matter the realization of e V , and so MM1
randomizes between trying to buy and trying to sell the asset. Thus, MM2
cannot fully infer MM1’s information.¤
24A perfectly simmetric argument applies to the case p < 21¡T.
346.1 The T-stages game
In this section we describe the equilibrium of the T-stages game ¡(p;T). As
we focus on Markov equilibria, at each stage t of trade, players’ strategy will
depend only on the state of the game °t = (T ¡ t + 1;pt).
To characterize the whole equilibrium bidding strategies, it is su¢cient to
provide the equilibrium bidding strategies pro…le and the equilibrium payo¤
for the …rst round of the game ¡(T;p) for any T and p. Indeed, the MMs’
strategies in the following round will correspond to the equilibrium strategy
of the …rst round of the game ¡(T ¡ 1;p2), where p2 = Pr(e V = V ja1;1;b1;1).
To begin with, we introduce the building blocks we will use to describe
the equilibrium strategies. For any natural number t ¸ 1 and for any natural







0 if j · 0







rj;t¡rj¡1;t for j · t





1 for j · 0








0 for j · 0
rj;t+rj¡1;t






0 for j · 0





For any state of the game we can now formally describe MMs’ equilibrium




frj;T ¸ pg (25)
35in other words i is such that p 2]ri¡1;T;ri;T].
















(V ¡ V ) (27)
¼
¤
2(T;p) = 0 (28)
MM2’s quotes distributions are:
G2(b) =
ri;T(¼¤
1(V ;T;p)¡´i;T¡1(V ¡V ))+(1¡ri;T)(¼¤
1(V ;T;p)¡´
i;T¡1(V ¡V ))
ri;TV +(1¡ri;T)V ¡b (29)
1 ¡ F2(a) =
ri¡1;T(¼¤





MM2’s posterior belief after observing that MM1 quotes a bid price
equal to b and sets an ask price that is certain to lose the auction is given by
Postbid(b) =
g(b)(b ¡ V )2
(V ¡ V )(g(b)(b ¡ V ) ¡ G(b))
(31)
Where G(b) is MM1’s bid price distribution in equilibrium when e V = V ,
and it can be obtained as the solution of the di¤erential equation implicitly
de…ned by the following system:
½
¼¤
1(V ;T;p) = (V ¡ b)G2(b) + (¹i;T¡1Postbid(b) + ´i;T¡1)(V ¡ V )
G(v) = 1
(32)
Where G2(:) is given by expression (29).




(1 ¡ p)(b ¡ V )
G(b) (33)
MM2’s posterior belief after observing that MM1, tries to sell the asset
at price a and sets a bid price that surely loses the auction is
Postask(a) =
f(a)(a ¡ V )2
(V ¡ V )(f(a)(a ¡ V ) + 1 ¡ F(a))
(34)
36Where F(a) is MM1’s ask price distribution in equilibrium when e V = V ,
and it can be obtained as the solution of the di¤erential equation implicitly
de…ned by the following system:
½
¼¤
1(V ;T;p) = (a ¡ V )(1 ¡ F2(a)) + (¹i¡1;T¡1Postask(a) + ´i¡1;T¡1)(V ¡ V )
F(v) = 0
(35)
where F2(:) is given by expression (30).
If e V = V , then MM1’s ask price distribution in equilibrium is given by
the following relation
1 ¡ F(a) =
p(V ¡ a)
(1 ¡ p)(a ¡ V )
(1 ¡ F(a)) (36)
The maximum ask amax and the minimum bid bmin that are posted with





Proof of proposition 3: The proof contains one lemma:
Lemma 9: Consider the game ¡(T;p). Let i = minj·Tfrj;T ¸ pg and let
F2(:), G2(:), F(:), G(:), F(:), G(:), Postbid(:), Postask(:) amax and bmin as
de…ned by (30), (29), (35), (32), (36), (33), (34), (31) and (37) respectively.
Then in equilibrium the bidding strategy in the …rst trading round are
(i) MM2 randomizes his ask and bid prices according to




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
F2(x) for x 2]v;amax]
1 for x 2]amax;1]




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;bmin]
G2(x) for x 2]bmin;v]
1 for x 2]v;1]
(ii) If the value of the asset is V then;with probability (1 ¡ F(amax)),
MM1 sets a1;1 = amax and randomizes his bid quotes on the support [v;bmin[
37; whereas, with probability F(amax), he sets b1;1 = bmin and randomizes his
ask on the support [v;amax]; moreover it results




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
F(x) for x 2]v;amax]
1 for x 2]amax;1]




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;bmin[
G(x) for x 2 [bmin;v[
1 for x 2]v;1]
(iii) If the value of the asset is V , then with probability (1 ¡ F(amax)),
MM1 sets a1;1 = amax and randomizes his bid quotes on the support [v;bmin[;
whereas with probability F(amax), he sets b1;1 = bmin and randomizes his ask
on the support [v;amax]; furthermore it results




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;v]
F(x) for x 2]v;amax]
1 for x 2]amax;1]




0 for x 2] ¡ 1;bmin[
G(x) for x 2 [bmin;v[
1 for x 2 [v;1]
(iv) MM2’s posterior belief is p2 = Pr(e V = V ja1;1;b1;1) with
p2 =
½
Postbid(b1;1) if b1;1 > bmin and a1;1 = amax
Postask(a1;1) if a1;1 < amax and b1;1 = bmin
(v) MMs’ equilibrium payo¤s are ¼¤
2(T;p) = 0, ¼¤
1(V ;T;p) = (¹i;Tp +
´i;T)(V ¡ V ) and ¼¤
1(V ;T;p) = (¹i;t + ´
i;t)(V ¡ V ).
Proof of lemma 9: We provide here only a sketch of the proof. Indeed
the equilibrium can be characterized recursively applying the method used
for the two period case (see section 3.3.1). 25
First, we give an intuition of the recursive construction of equilibrium
supports. Fixing a date t, for all natural numbers j · t we generate the
numbers rj;t recursively starting from r0;T = 0 and r1;T = 1. In this way, we
25The complete proof is available upon request from the authors.
38partition the interval [0;1] in successively many j sub-intervals [rj;:;rj+1;:] as
the end of the game T gets further in time. For each of this sub-intervals, we
can compute the vector (¹j;t, ´j;t, ¹
j;t, ´
j;t) that gives us MM1’s expected
payo¤ if pt 2]rj¡1;t;rj;t], as described in (26) and (31). Within each sub-
interval, then, MM1(V ) and MM1(V )’s equilibrium payo¤ are still linear
in the initial p as it is the case in the one shot game.26 This allows us to
construct the equilibrium strategies exactly in the same way we constructed
the equilibrium for the twice repeated game. The only di¤erence is that now
the belief pt follows a process that makes it jump into di¤erent sub-intervals
at each stage. Namely if p 2 [ri¡1;T;ri;T] and MM1 tries to buy (resp. to
sell) the asset, then posterior belief will belong to the interval [ri¡1;T¡1;ri;T¡1]
(resp. [ri¡2;T¡1;ri¡1;T¡1]). Thus one has to take into account the piecewise
linearity of MM’s continuation payo¤ when writing di¤erential equations
(32) and (36). Apart from this, the characterization of MMs’ equilibrium
strategies is analogous to that given in section 3.3.1. ¤
In order to complete the proof of proposition 3, it is su¢cient to prove
that the equilibrium described in lemma 8 satis…es the properties of the
equilibrium described in proposition 3. Firstly we show that when e c < 21¡T,
then in the …rst trade, the informed MM tries only to win the pro…table
auction of the market. Indeed if e c < 21¡T, then either e V = V and p < 21¡T,
or e V = V and p > 1 ¡ 21¡T. Take the case e V = V and p > 1 ¡ 21¡T, a
similar argument applies to the other case. We want to prove that when
e V = V and p > 1¡21¡T, in the …rst round of traded MM1 only tries to sell
the asset. Considering expression (25) and that rT¡1;T = 1 ¡ 21¡T, we have
that i = T as p 2 [rT¡1;T;rT;T], and so ri;T = 1. Substituting such ri;T in
(29) and considering that ´T;T¡1 = 0, we have G2(b) = ¼¤
1(V ;T;p)=(V ¡ b).
Substituting this expression for G2(b) in (32), it results that the system
(32) is satis…ed if, and only if, MM1(V )’s continuation payo¤ is zero for
any b 2]bmin;v], i.e. (¹i;T¡1Postbid(b) + ´i;T¡1)(V ¡ V ) = 0. However, this
happens only if MM1 fully reveals that e V = V whenever he tries to buy the
asset in the …rst round. But this is possible if, and only if, in the …rst round
MM1 does not try to buy the asset when e V = V .
To see that when e c > 21¡T, MM1 participates to the unpro…table auction
with positive probability consider the case e V = V and p < 1¡21¡T . 27 Then
26Moreover, MM1(V ) and MM1(V )’s equilibrium payo¤ are continuous in p 2 [0;1].
27A similar argument applies to e V = V and p > 1 ¡ 21¡T.
39i < T and ri;t < 1. Therefore G2(b) 6= ¼¤
1(V ;T;p)=(V ¡ b) for (29), and so
MM1(V )’s continuation payo¤ must be positive for (32). But this only
happens if MM1(V )’s private information is not completely revealed when
he tries to buy the asset. This means that MM1(V ) also tries to buy the
asset with positive probability.¥
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